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Abstract 1 
Much attention has focussed on the dramatic expansion of the forebrain, particularly the 2 
neocortex, as the neural substrate of cognitive evolution. However, though relatively small, 3 
the cerebellum contains about four times more neurons than the neocortex. I show that 4 
commonly used comparative measures such as neocortex ratio underestimate the contribution 5 
of the cerebellum to brain evolution. Once differences in the scaling of connectivity in 6 
neocortex and cerebellum are accounted for, a marked and general pattern of correlated 7 
evolution of the two structures is apparent. One deviation from this general pattern is a 8 
relative expansion of the cerebellum in apes and other extractive foragers. The confluence of 9 
these comparative patterns, studies of ape foraging skills and social learning, and recent 10 
evidence on the cognitive neuroscience of the cerebellum, suggests an important role for the 11 
cerebellum in the evolution of the capacity for planning, execution and understanding of 12 
complex behavioural sequences – including tool use and language. There is no clear 13 
separation between sensory-motor and cognitive specializations underpinning such skills, 14 
undermining the notion of executive control as a distinct process. Instead, I argue that 15 
cognitive evolution is most effectively understood as the elaboration of specialized systems 16 




The idea that there was likely to have been a wide variety of selection pressures on 2  cognitive abilities, and a corresponding variety of neural evolutionary responses  [1‐3], 3  has been rather lost in the current enthusiasm for monolithic explanations for the 4  evolution of large brains, including social intelligence [4], behavioural flexibility [5], and 5  general intelligence [6‐7]. These general explanations are associated with the search for 6  a single comparative brain measure that best reflects general cognitive ability, such as 7  neocortex ratio [8‐9], ‘executive brain’ ratio [10‐11] and even whole brain size [12‐13]. 8  A relatively strong correlation between the putatively critical behavioural variable and a 9  particular comparative brain measure is sometimes taken to suggest that the measure 10  identified does indeed most effectively capture the neurological basis of cognitive 11  evolution [8, 13]. 12 
Empirically, there is a problem with this approach: comparative studies have not 13  produced a single, unified picture of the relationship between such measures and 14  behaviours. Healy & Rowe [14] summarised the picture as one of a “bewildering array of 15  correlations between brain size and behavioural traits” (p.456), a picture which shows 16  little sign of resolving. For example, while Dunbar & Shultz [9] argue that the central 17  aspect of primate brain evolution is the correlation between neocortex size and social 18  group size, Reader et al. [11] find that neocortex and ‘executive brain’ size correlate 19  strongly with a composite measure of general intelligence that cuts across the 20  social/non‐social domain, and that this composite measure does not correlate with 21  social group size.  22 
There are also theoretical reasons to question the underlying assumption that 23  intelligence evolved in a unitary way and can in principle be measured by a single, ideal 24  comparative brain measure.  First, which measure achieves the strongest correlation 25 
  4 with a putatively important aspect of behaviour should not be the sine qua non for 1  deciding how to measure cognitive evolution. Indeed it is circular to argue that a 2  particular measure is ideal because it most strongly supports a hypothesis.  Second, 3  organisms are subject to a wide variety of challenges. For example, they may be aquatic 4  or terrestrial; they may be active at night or by day; they may be more or less social; 5  they may graze on abundant plants, search for rare fruits, or hunt for prey; they may 6  learn complex songs; they may store food and recover it by memory.  Each of these and 7  other dimensions of behavioural ecology have been shown to correlate with brain size 8  and/or with a specific and relevant aspect of brain structure [14‐20]. And studies of 9  phylogenetic variation in the brain structure of mammals and birds indicate not one or 10  two dimensions of variation but many [21‐24].  11 
A further problem is that critical assumptions underlying the use of brain size indices 12  remain largely untested. Volume of a brain region is potentially related to cognitive 13  capacities to the extent that it correlates with more functionally meaningful variables 14  such as numbers of neurons and synapses. Recent work suggests that the relationship 15  between volume and neuron number or density varies, between taxonomic groups and 16  between brain structures  [25‐26]. Such variability potentially presents problems for 17  inferring functional consequences from relative size measures, such as volumetric ratios 18  between one structure and another.  Here I examine the consequences of volumetric 19  ratios for relative numbers of neurons in the neocortex and cerebellum, and I argue that 20  an excessive emphasis on the neocortex has obscured important patterns in brain 21  evolution and led to an unwarranted neglect of the cerebellum. I then re‐examine 22  phylogenetic correlates of neocortex and cerebellum size. 23 
In the light of these results, I develop a synthesis of the comparative, anatomical and 24  functional neuroscience data. This synthesis stresses the unity of sensory‐motor and 25 
  5 cognitive evolution. Classically, distinctions are made between cognition, as a process of 1  interpreting and integrating information about the outside world, the perceptual 2  information that this process is about, and the motor commands that represent the 3  output of cognitive processes [27]. More recently these distinctions have been broken 4  down by the recognition that cognition is best conceived as a set of processes mediating 5  the adaptive control of bodies in environments; the concept of embodied cognition [28‐6  33].  This perspective suggests that “a key aspect of human cognition is . . . the 7  adaptation of sensory‐motor brain mechanisms to serve new roles in reason and 8  language, while retaining their original function as well.” [34, p. 456]. Here I argue that 9 
understanding brain evolution both contributes to and is benefited by this perspective. 10 
 11 
Methods 12 
I use phylogenetic comparative analyses of brain component volumes and neuron numbers 13  to test hypotheses about the evolutionary determinants and cognitive consequences of 14  brain structure evolution. Analyses include broad patterns of brain evolution across 15  mammalian orders and more focussed analyses of behavioural correlates within 16  primates.  In the absence of direct observation of evolutionary processes, phylogenetic 17  comparative analysis provides a powerful technique for investigating evolutionary 18  patterns and processes [35], such as correlated trait evolution. A variety of methods now 19  exists, but the underlying rationale of each is that combining information on 20  phylogenetic relationships among species with data on their phenotypic traits allows 21  one to statistically model the evolution of those traits along the branches of the tree 22  representing their relationships [35]. To assess how different brain and behavioural 23  traits evolved in relation to one another, I used Phylogenetic Generalised Least Squares, 24  which incorporates phylogeny into statistical models [36‐38]. Further details of this 25 
  6 method and data used are provided in supplementary information. Results are 1  presented in the context of discussion of a series of key questions, and embedded where 2  appropriate to the discussion rather than consolidated in a single results section.  3 
 4 
Is the neocortex the “intelligent” bit of the brain? 5 
The brain structure most often identified with ‘higher’ cognitive functions is the neocortex 6 
[39], having been described, for example, as “the crowning achievement of evolution and the 7 
biological substrate of human mental prowess” [40]. The assumption that the neocortex is the 8 
place to look for evidence about cognitive evolution drives much comparative research and 9 
even the selection of regions of interest in the study of fossil hominin endocasts [41].  10 
Why this focus on the neocortex? One reason is undoubtedly the simple observation that it is 11 
disproportionately large in large-brained species. In small-brained mammals such as shrews 12 
the neocortex comprises as little as 15% of brain volume, whereas in monkeys the 13 
corresponding figure is about 65-75% and in humans it is about 80% [42-43]. The 14  correlation between brain size and neocortical proportion (or ratio) may, however, have 15  more to do with allometric scaling than with cognitive selection pressures. Cortical 16  proportions are generally high in large‐bodied species, such as sea lions (66%) [44}, 17  camels (71%) [45] and sperm whales (87%) [45].  Whilst it might be tempting to 18  speculate on the hitherto unappreciated intelligence of these species, the most 19  parsimonious explanation is that they are just large animals. Indeed, controlling for 20  phylogenetic effects, there is a strong correlation between body size and proportion of 21  the brain that is neocortex (PGLS; λ=0.92, t=14.23, p<0.0001).  There is no such 22  correlation for the cerebellum (λ=0.93, t=1.25, p=0.21). 23 
  7 Why does the cortex balloon in proportional size as body size (and overall brain size 1  increase)?  Apparently because of a need to devote increasing brain space to making cortical 2 
connections: larger cortices are increasingly made up of white rather than grey matter (Figure 3 
1a, see also [46-47]. In the cerebellum, there is a much less steep increase in white matter 4 
volume with overall size (Figure 1b; and see ref. 47). Hence connectivity scales in different 5 
ways in these two structures. 6 
The reasons for this difference in white versus grey matter scaling presumably relate to the 7 
basic connectional architecture of the mammalian brain. Much of the neocortical white matter 8 
consists of fibres that make long-range connections, in which increases in axon diameter and 9 
myelination are necessary to preserve processing speed over longer conduction distances in 10 
larger brains [48-49]. The relative ballooning of the neocortex in large (and large-brained) 11 
animals may therefore be driven by allometric connectional constraints rather than by any 12 
special cognitive selection pressures.   One implication is that ratio measures of relative brain 13 
structure size used commonly in comparative studies, such as neocortex ratio [8], “executive” 14 
brain ratio [7, 10-11] and “cerebrotype” [50] conflate allometric scaling with selection on 15 
specific brain regions. A volumetric ratio between neocortex and other structures potentially 16 
underestimates selection on non-cortical (e.g. cerebellar) functions.  17 
The striking variation in the proportional size of the mammalian neocortex cannot therefore 18 
be simplistically read as reflecting selection specifically on cortical functions. This is further 19 
emphasised by the lack of correspondence between volumetric ratios and numbers of neurons. 20 
In stark contrast to the way that cortical volume proportion scales up with brain size, cortical 21 
neuron number proportion is unrelated to brain size [26] and unrelated to cortical volume 22 
proportion [25]. Similarly, the ratio of cortical to cerebellar volumes is uncorrelated with the 23 
ratio of cortical to cerebellar neurons (PGLS; λ=0.63, t2,23=1.13, p=0.27), casting doubt on the 24 
functional significance of volumetric ratios. Neuron density decreases as brain size increases 25 
in both neocortex  (PGLS: λ=0.83, slope =-0.23, t2,23=  4.55, p< 0.0002) and cerebellum 26 
  8 
(PGLS: λ=0.76, slope =-0.04, t= 2.43, p=0.02), but the decline is significantly steeper in the 1 
neocortex (difference in PGLS coefficients: t=3.92, p=0.0008). The same is true when neuron 2 
densities of the two structures are related to their volumes rather than to overall brain size 3 
(t=2.86, p=0.009).  Hence, the increase in neocortical volume proportion with brain size is 4 
traded off against a steeper decrease in neuron density. 5 
 Evidently there are different scaling constraints on each structure. Figure 2 illustrates the 6 
markedly different patterns of cross-species variability in proportional volumes and 7 
proportional neuron numbers, as well as the much larger number of neurons in the cerebellum 8 
than in the neocortex of all species. These results question both the validity of volumetric 9 
ratios as useful measures of information-processing capacity and the justification based on 10 
their variability across species for the near-exclusive focus of comparative studies on the 11 
neocortex. 12 
As pervasive as the assumption that neocortical expansion underpinned the evolution of 13 
“higher” cognition is the assumption that it was the frontal lobes in particular that expanded 14 
most. Comparative data are relatively sparse, and most attention has focussed on whether 15 
human frontal lobes are relatively large compared with their size in other primates [51‐60]. 16  The question has until recently remained unresolved, largely because of confusion over 17  whether proportional size or size relative to allometric scaling provides the most useful 18  measure.  Because frontal lobe volume, like overall neocortex volume but to an even greater 19 
extent, scales hyper-allometrically, human frontal areas are large as a proportion of brain or 20 
neocortex size [53-54, 59-60]. However, there is no more reason to think that proportional or 21 
absolute volume is a good measure of functional specialization for the frontal lobes than there 22 
is to believe it for the neocortex as a whole. Recent allometric analyses reveal that, although 23 
absolute and proportional frontal region size increased rapidly in hominins, this change was 24 
associated with size increase in other areas and whole brain size, rather than with 25 
  9 
specialization for enlarged frontal lobes specifically [57, 61-63]. Consistent with allometric 1 
effects, neuron densities are particularly low in human frontal cortex [58]. Interestingly, there 2 
is stronger evidence for relative enlargement of temporal lobe structures [64-65]. This does 3 
not suggest that the frontal lobes were unimportant in cognitive evolution, just that their 4 
importance needs to be interpreted in terms of the areas with which they connect and with 5 
which they have co-evolved, including the cerebellum [61-62].  6 
 7 
Cerebella comes to the ball: relative expansion and co-variation of neocortex and 8 
cerebellum 9 
Although allometric scaling explains much of the variation in proportional neocortex size, it 10 
does not explain all of it.  After taking scaling against other brain structures into account, 11 
primates have relatively large neocortices [23], and a relatively high density of cortical 12 
neurons [48]. However, the cerebellum is also larger [66] and contains more neurons in 13 
primates compared to other mammals (Figure 3). This conjoint expansion of the two 14  structures early in primate evolution reflects a general evolutionary trend for the two 15  structures to evolve together, in primates in particular [23, 26, 62, 67], and more 16  generally during mammalian evolution (Figure 4).  17 
There are three compelling aspects of the evidence for correlated evolution of the 18  neocortex and cerebellum. First, it is apparent after accounting for variability in the size 19  of other brain structures, discounting the possibility that it is a reflection of some global 20  allometric or developmental constraint acting across the whole brain. Second, there is a 21  striking correspondence between the patterns of correlated evolution among specific 22  components of the cortico‐cerebellar system and their anatomical connectivity, down to 23  the level of individual nuclei [62, 67]. Third, it is evident not just in terms of volumes, but 24  also in two independent data sets on numbers and densities of neurons (Figure S1). 25 
  10  1  The linkage between neocortical and cerebellar expansion suggests that both 2  contributed significantly to brain size evolution. Indeed, a phylogenetic analysis reveals 3  that, controlling for body mass, mammalian brain size is positively and independently 4  correlated with both neocortex and cerebellum, and also that there is a significant 5  interaction between the effects of the two structures on brain size (PGLS, brain mass 6  regressed on: body mass, t=8.47, p<0.0001; neocortex, t=19.73, p<0.0001; cerebellum, 7  t=12.35, p<0.0001; interaction between neocortex and cerebellum, t=4.04, p<0.0001; 8 
λ=0.92, n=298 mammal species). The combination of significant main and interaction 9  effects suggests that the evolution of brain size was a product of both independent and 10  coordinated size change of neocortex and cerebellum.  11 
Previous work demonstrated a strong association between relative neocortex size and 12  visual specialization in non‐human primates [19‐20, 48]. Is the pattern of cortico‐visual 13  evolution confounded by cortico‐cerebellar evolution? Further analysis suggests not: 14  neocortex volume is significantly and independently correlated with volumes of both 15  LGN and cerebellum, after accounting for variation in other brain structures (PGLS, 16  neocortex volume regressed on volumes of cerebellum, LGN and rest of the brain; 17 
λ=0.87, r2=0.98; LGN, t4,42=3.46, p=0.001; cerebellum, t4,42=4.20, p=0.0002). The same 18  pattern is found after subtracting primary visual area V1 from total neocortex volume 19  (λ=0.89, r2=0.98, n=42; LGN, t4,42=2.82, p=0.008; cerebellum, t4,42=4.26, p=0.0001), 20  emphasising that extra‐striate cortex is not “non‐visual” [68].  The latter point is 21  important, as different scaling trends for V1 and non‐V1 against brain size have been 22  misinterpreted as evidence against the visual specialization hypothesis [59].  In 23  summary, variation in primate neocortex size is strongly related to the evolution both of 24  visual structures and the cerebellum. 25 
  11 Several comparative studies suggest that cerebellar expansion, specifically involving the 1  lateral cerebellum, was especially marked in apes [69‐71]. It therefore seems that the 2  cerebellum ‐ modestly concealed beneath the volumetrically dominating neocortex, and 3  largely ignored – may be the Cinderella of the study of brain evolution. This conclusion is 4  reinforced by growing evidence that ascribing to it the task of basic chores in adaptive 5  neural processes has also been a mistake. 6 
 7 
Cognitive implications 8 
It has long been known that the cerebellum is involved in sensory‐motor control and 9  learning of motor skills [72‐73]. The relative expansion of the cerebellum in primates 10  together with stereopsis and elaboration of the visual system [68, 19‐20] presumably 11  underpins primates’ fine visuo‐motor control and manual dexterity. For example, 12  smooth‐pursuit eye‐movements in primates are based on a unique cortico‐cerebellar 13  pathway that evolved together with foveal vision [74].  14 
However, in the past ten years or so considerable evidence has accumulated that the 15  cerebellum has a broader role than previously recognised, including emotion [75‐76], 16  non‐motor associative learning [77], working memory and mental rehearsal [77‐78), 17  verbal working memory and other language functions [76, 78‐81], spatial and episodic 18  memory [79, 81‐82], event prediction [83], empathy and predicting others’ actions [84‐19  87], imitation [88], planning and decision‐making (79, 89‐90], individual variation in 20  cognitive performance [91], and cognitive developmental disorders including autism 21  [80, 92].  22 
Some have argued that the case for cognitive functions of the cerebellum remains 23  unproven [72, 93]. The details of this debate are beyond the scope of this paper, but 24 
  12 three general points can be made. First, although some studies have been criticised for 1  failure to control for eye movements [93], the overall weight of evidence of many clinical 2  and functional imaging studies indicates cerebellar involvement in a wide variety of 3  cognitive processes [94].  Second, the cerebellum and neocortex are massively 4  interconnected [78, 90], and these connections involve many cortical areas, again 5  suggesting a wide range of functions.  Third, the distinction between sensory‐motor 6  control and cognition is arbitrary and an impediment to understanding brain function 7  and evolution. Dissolving this distinction (see below) makes the debate on the 8  cerebellum one about the range of its functions rather than a question of whether or not 9  it has cognitive functions.   10 
The classical view of cortico‐cerebellar connections was that the cerebellum collected 11  sensory information and returned it to primary motor cortex for the generation of 12  movements [90]. However, it is now known that all major cortical regions, i.e. beyond 13  motor cortex and including frontal and prefrontal areas, have reciprocal connections 14  with the cerebellum. These cortico‐cerebellar loops form multiple, independent 15  anatomical modules which are architecturally quite uniform  [90, 96].  This anatomical 16  uniformity together with functional data suggest basic similarities in the computations 17  performed in different functional domains by different cortico‐cerebellar modules [96‐18  97]. These computations act as internal models or simulations of cortical processes that 19  continuously update and error‐correct responses, based on a comparison of actual and 20  expected inputs, and they underlie a wide range of behavioural control processes [89, 21  96‐97). Thus, internal models generated by the cerebellum guide behaviour in different 22  domains. Direct control of behaviour, prediction of its consequences, and reasoning 23  about it, may be mediated by similar cortico‐cerebellar computations, with functional 24  differences determined by which specific cortico‐cerebellar modules are activated and 25 




Computational commonality across functional domains with overlapping neural 10  substrates may in fact be a rather generic feature of the brain. For example, social and 11  non‐social decision‐making activate adjacent brain regions in the anterior cingulate and 12  are mediated by the same computational processes, suggesting that social and non‐13  social cognition may not be as encapsulated or specialised as has been assumed [99].  In 14  another example, social rejection and physical pain activate overlapping brain regions, 15  including somatosensory cortex and cerebellum [100]. Similarly, Shackman et al  [101] 16  argue that cognitive control, negative affect and pain share an overlapping neural 17  substrate and a common computational structure, and suggest the term “adaptive 18  control” as an encompassing term for these processes. Shackman et al.  [101] point to 19  the intriguing fact that all three processes activate muscles of the upper face, further 20  emphasising commonalities across processes traditionally distinguished as “executive” 21  and non‐executive. Here, functional distinctions result from divergent patterns of 22  connection rather than fundamentally different types of computation. Thus, individual 23  brain regions contribute to multiple functional modules, and become secondarily 24  adapted for use in different systems through the evolution of new connections [32, 95]. 25 
  14  1 
Technical skills, cognitive sequencing, and language  2  An adaptive control function in which the cerebellum plays a critical role is the 3  modelling, prediction and organization of sequences of events and behaviours, including 4  sequences involved in tool‐making and use, and language comprehension and 5  production [73, 77‐78,, 81, 90, 98, 102].  Thus, the cerebellum is involved in learning of 6  procedural sequences, recognition of correct spatial and temporal relations among 7  behaviourally relevant actions, temporal organization of verbal utterances and planning 8  of speech, and mental rehearsal [81].  It also seems to be involved in processing more 9  abstract sequences such as in story comprehension [103]. 10 
There is an intriguing confluence between this evidence for cerebellar involvement in 11  the temporal organization, comprehension and learning of sequences, evidence of 12  cerebellar expansion in great apes [69‐71], and observations of the facility of these 13  species for extractive foraging and tool use [104], including the flexible recombination of 14  tool components or elements of a problem [105], and for solving problems requiring 15  sensitivity to sequence information [106]. Byrne [107‐108] argues that great ape 16  extractive foraging skills are based on iterated, hierarchically‐organized, multi‐stage 17  algorithms for solving “syntactical” problems (problems requiring behaviours to be 18  performed and flexibly recombined in functional sequences), and that they are socially 19  learned, possibly by programme‐level imitation [109].  Cerebellar specialization in 20  ancestral great apes may therefore have been a precursor to neural capacities 21  underlying the later development of cumulative cultures of more complex technologies 22  in hominins [110, 111].  23 
Parallels between the organization of behavioural sequences in extractive foraging and 24  tool use on one hand, and in language processing on the other, may indicate that neural 25 
  15 specialization for the first was a pre‐adaptation for the second [95, 112‐114], with 1  gestural communication probably representing an intermediate stage [114]. Indeed, 2  there is overlap in brain areas activated during linguistic processing and other 3  hierarchically organized motor acts such as tool construction [32, 95, 112‐113]. In 4  addition to classical cortical language areas, the cerebellum is activated by speech 5  comprehension tasks [95, 98, 115]. Hence, language may have been built from pre‐6  existing sensory‐motor specializations common to all great apes [95].  7 
 8 
Technical versus social intelligence and brain evolution 9 
The evidence of cerebellar expansion and involvement in diverse cognitive functions 10  suggests that the well‐known link between neocortex size and social group size [8] may 11  not be the only important feature of primate neuro‐cognitive evolution; selection on 12  foraging skills may have been important too [70, 116]. A new phylogenetic comparative 13  analysis controlling for allometric effects supports this contention (Table 1). First, the 14  well‐known correlation between neocortex (or brain) size and social group size is 15  recovered, but neocortex size also correlates with foraging skills. Second, cerebellum 16  size also correlates with both types of behavioural variable. Third, there is evidence of 17  an evolutionary brain‐behaviour double dissociation; when controlling for the size of 18  other brain structures , cerebellum size correlates markedly more strongly with foraging 19  skill than it does with social group size and more strongly than neocortex size does with 20  foraging skill, whereas for neocortex size the reverse pattern is observed. This is 21  confirmed by analyses of each structure with the other included as a predictor; 22  neocortex size then correlates significantly with social group size (t6,36=3.92, p=0.0005) 23  but not extractive foraging (t6,36=1.01, p=0.32), whereas cerebellum size correlates 24  significantly with extractive foraging (t6,36=3.59, p=0.001) but not social group size 25 
  16 (t6,36=1.33, p=0.19). Although these results, together with those showing cerebellum‐1  specific expansion in apes, certainly imply a degree of functional dissociation and 2  independent evolution of the two structures, it is important to emphasise that each 3  structure does correlate with both behavioural variables when not controlling for the 4  other (in line with the evidence of coordinated cortico‐cerebellar evolution). Thus, 5  behavioural specializations seem to be based on a combination of both independent and 6  coordinated evolution of individual brain structures.  7 
Primate tool use frequently occurs in the context of extractive forging and involves 8  similarly complex, organised sequences of behaviours [113]. Fewer species are recorded 9  as using tools than using extractive foraging [7]. Nevertheless, broadly similar results 10  are obtained for tool use. Controlling for body size, and residual brain volume, 11  cerebellum size correlates with tool use (t5,36=2.04, p=0.050) but not social group size 12  (t6,36=1.47, p=0.15), while neocortex size correlates with social group size (t6,36=3.98, 13  p=0.0003) but not tool use (t6,36=0.71, p=0.48).  14 
 15 
Co­evolution of social and technical intelligence 16 
The debate about whether it was selection on social or technical intelligence that drove 17  the evolution of brain size and cognitive capacities has increasingly appeared to be 18  resolved in favour of the former [8, 9]. Based on the evidence presented above, and in 19  common with some other recent authors (33, 108, 112‐114], I suggest not only that 20  selection pressures on both social and technical skills were important, but also that they 21  interacted with one another during human evolution. The theoretical argument is 22  elaborated by Barrett et al [33], who persuasively argue  that the social and physical 23  environment form mutually reinforcing feedback loops.  24 
  17 Specialization for technical intelligence seems particularly relevant to aspects of great 1  ape behaviour. Great apes do not live in particularly large groups, but they are adept at 2  extractive foraging and tool use, and at learning these skills by observation of others 3  [104‐105, 113]. The capacities to perform such behaviours, and to learn them by 4  observing others, may be intrinsically linked. Byrne [112] argues that both depend on 5  “behaviour parsing”: the capacity to segment and mentally organise a sequence of acts 6  into its subroutines based on the statistical regularities among the observed acts.  This 7  capacity is likely to have its origin in foraging skills; the relative lack of physiological 8  adaptations for digesting high‐fibre plant material in apes compared to Old World 9  monkeys would have put a premium on extraction of more nutritious resources from 10  hard or tough shells, spiny plants, termite mounds and other challenging defences. Once, 11  however, the capacity to parse action sequences was established, it could have been 12  exapted for use in the social domain, forming a basis for the prediction of conspecifics’ 13  behaviour [108‐112].   14 
 15 
Embodied simulation and social understanding 16 
A sensory‐motor origin of socio‐cognitive capacities, and a linkage between the ability to 17  execute complex behavioural sequences and to perceive and decode them when 18  observing others, both fit with data indicating that the neural systems activated during a 19  particular behaviour are also activated when observing the same behaviour performed 20  by another individual [117]. It may therefore be that simulating the neural states 21  underlying behaviours contributes to understanding them during observation. For 22  example, the recognition of emotional expressions is disrupted by transcranial magnetic 23  stimulation of somatosensory cortex, implying that activation of the system for 24  producing expressions contributes to decoding them [118]. Computational work also 25 
  18 supports the idea that simulation may provide a direct link between sensory‐motor 1  control and social understanding [119], and there are close computational parallels 2  between motor control and control of social interactions [120] 3 
Although most work on embodied social simulation has focussed on the activity of  4  “mirror neurons” localised to a few cortical regions, such mirror‐like properties are 5  likely to be a function of the way that neurons are embedded in more distributed neural 6  networks involved in sensory‐motor processing [121‐124], and experimental evidence 7  now implicates the cerebellum [85‐87, 90, 125‐126]. The “mirror neuron system” may 8  thus not be a functionally specialised neural circuit restricted to a few cortical areas, nor 9  an adaptation evolved specifically for action understanding, and as such may not merit 10  the term “system” [121]. Instead, mirroring may be a rather general adaptive property 11  of neural systems with the right architecture for forming associations between one’s 12  own and others’ actions , and may be phylogenetically widespread [127].  13 
Damasio and Meyer [123] outline in broad form a model of mirror neurons based on 14  “retro‐activation”, the key to which is a neural architecture in which anterior association 15  areas send signals back to visual cortex (and even to the visual thalamus).  The 16  comparatively large size and great complexity of primate visual and visuo‐motor 17  systems, including numerous reciprocal connections between anterior and posterior 18  visual areas, and between these areas and association areas in frontal and temporal 19  cortices [68, 128], may therefore have implications for primate social cognition without 20  necessarily having evolved primarily as an adaptation for it. However, an interesting 21  question is then whether, once a sensory‐motor system has mirroring potential, this 22  potential is exploited by further evolutionary adaptive strengthening of critical 23  connections in more social species, or perhaps inhibited in species or domains of 24 
  19 behaviour where mirroring would be disadvantageous (for example, mirroring of 1  subordinate expressions in dominance interactions).  2 
 3 
Conclusions: 4   5  The search for a single ideal comparative brain measure that captures the neural basis of 6  cognitive evolution is likely to be more obfuscatory than illuminating, because different 7  selection pressures have acted on different neural systems at different times. Whilst 8  there are general patterns, such as the tendency of neocortex and cerebellum to evolve 9  together, there are also significant deviations from such trends, such as visual pathway 10  expansion in primates, and cerebellar expansion in apes. Gross brain size and composite 11  brain indices or ratios therefore conflate different neural adaptations and mask 12  important evolutionary patterns. In order to understand the neural basis of cognitive 13  evolution, appropriate statistical, phylogenetic analyses that tease apart the variation 14  associated with different neural systems and due to different selection pressures will 15  therefore be more useful than composite indices.  16   17  Any account of human neuro‐cognitive evolution needs to explain why there are so 18  many neurons in the cerebellum. The answer suggested here, based on converging 19  comparative and experimental evidence, is that the cerebellum and cortico‐cerebellar 20  networks are key components of systems enabling the control, organization and 21  comprehension of complex sequences involved in both technical and social intelligence, 22  and, ultimately, language. These proposals agree with Sterelny’s [114] scenario for 23  language evolution which suggests that the control of motor sequences involved in ape 24  foraging skills provided a cognitive platform for gestural communication and thence 25  ultimately syntax and language, and with Fitch’s [95] proposal that motor control and 26  hierarchical action planning systems were secondarily adapted for syntax.  27 
  20   1 
The evidence presented here suggests that sensory‐motor and cognitive evolution are 2  not dissociable. In common with Barrett [33], I argue that there is no need to postulate a 3  distinct set of “cognitive” processes to fill the supposed gap between sensory reception 4  and motor output. Even “offline” and seemingly abstract cognitive processes, such as 5  number representation and metaphor, appear to be “body based” [31, 129‐130], and 6  many allegedly abstract, centralized cognitive processes recruit distributed sensory‐7  motor systems that evolved to control bodily movement [31]. By extension, cognitive 8  evolution is to be understood as the elaboration of embodied control systems, rather 9  than of a disembodied reasoning device [28, 30]. As a corollary, there is no “intelligent”, 10  “executive” or indeed “Fodorian” [131] bit of the brain that holds the key to cognitive 11  evolution. Instead, the evolution of large brains was associated with the elaboration of 12  sensory‐motor mechanisms for the adaptive control of bodies in their environments.  13 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of the 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Significant 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 associations indicated 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bold. 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Model 1, 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was 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and 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& 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were 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the 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in Model 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was 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t4,42, p‐value Body mass  18.0, <0.0001  0.95, 0.35   3.12, 0.003 
Volume of residual brain portion  ­­  12.37, <0.0001  8.93, <0.0001 
Group size   3.47, 0.001  5.55, <0.0001  2.64, 0.012 
Extractive foraging  2.73, 0.01  2.07, 0.045  3.58, 0.0009 
λ  >0.99  >0.99  >0.99 
Model summary        
Maximised log‐likelihood  38.7  33.6  65.2 
Adjusted R2  0.92  0.98  0.99  10 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Figure 1: White matter proportion increases more steeply with size in neocortex than in 3  cerebellum. Proportion of volume of (a) neocortex and (b) cerebellum that is white 4  matter, plotted against volume of each structure (mm3). The graphs plot data for the 5  same species and the PGLS slopes are significantly different (see text).  6 
 7 
8 








Figure 4.  Correlated evolution of neocortex and cerebellum size in mammals.  Neocortex 3  size and cerebellum size are positively correlated after controlling for phylogenetic 4  effects and volume of other brain regions (PGLS, neocortex volume regressed on volume 5  of cerebellum controlling for volume of the rest of the brain; λ=0.0.97, t3,298 =8.85 , 6  p<0.0001).  7 
 8 
